DeHealthFoundation · UA

11 November 2026

Attacks on refrigeration systems in Europe: an analysis of Denys Tsvaig's position

Denys Tsvaig, co-founder of DeHealth and president of the National Cybersecurity Association, has published a column in UNIAN on the wave of attacks against refrigeration equipment in Europe and the United States. What follows is an analysis of his argument: what the primary sources confirm, which conclusion actually follows, where the available data runs out, and what this means for systems that hold medicines, vaccines, blood products and health data.

On 11 November 2026, UNIAN published a column by Denys Tsvaig, co-founder of DeHealth, cyberwarfare expert and president of Ukraine's National Cybersecurity Association. It ran in the opinion section. Because the author co-founded this company, what follows is not a summary but an analysis: the facts, the argument, and what the available data does not contain, kept apart.

What happened: the record

In October 2026, refrigeration equipment in French retail chains was remotely interfered with. According to Les Mousquetaires, Intermarché's parent company, around 180 Intermarché and Netto stores were affected; other reports give higher counts. The wave then spread further across Europe. The French agency responsible for blood products reported an incident at a refrigeration equipment supplier that altered temperature and defrost settings at three sites holding blood products.

In the United States, in late August 2026, refrigeration and freezer units at several military commissaries switched into defrost mode overnight. The Pentagon is treating these failures as a suspected cyberattack, but has publicly confirmed neither an intrusion nor a perpetrator. On 5 November, CISA, the FBI and the federal departments for health, agriculture and transportation issued a joint fact sheet on active threats to industrial refrigeration and cold chain monitoring systems, together with a list of mitigations.

When five federal agencies address equipment owners at the same time, spoiled stock is no longer the subject. Among the sectors the fact sheet names, healthcare stands alongside food and transportation.

Why ice cream is the wrong name for this story

The central distinction in the column is not between large and small losses but between two kinds of systems. IT is mail, databases, websites, accounting. OT is the software and controllers that govern physical equipment: refrigeration controllers, building management systems, power generation. In office IT, the priority is to preserve data and keep a service available. In OT the first question is different: what happens to equipment and to people if a controller starts executing the wrong commands.

«A system that supervises itself may not notice that it has already been deceived.»
– Denys Tsvaig, UNIAN

The practical consequence is a requirement for an independent safety loop. The author reduces it to questions that can actually be checked: is the alarm independent of the main controller, can staff safely switch to local control, and will the logs survive so the sequence of events can be reconstructed. These are quantities verifiable in a particular hospital or a particular warehouse, not general aspirations.

Physical consequences: the Ukrainian and Polish cases

On 22 and 23 January 2024, a cyberattack on Lviv's district heating left some 600 buildings without heat for nearly two days in sub-zero temperatures. Researchers at Dragos linked the incident to FrostyGoop, malware built to work with industrial controllers: the attackers did not destroy the equipment but made the controllers report incorrect measurements, so the system operated incorrectly. Dragos has not publicly attributed the attack to any state or group.

On 29 December 2025, a coordinated attack hit Poland's energy sector: according to CERT Polska's follow-up report, 30 wind and solar installations and a large combined heat and power plant. Communications and remote control at substations were disrupted and destructive malware was deployed, but neither power nor heat supply was interrupted. CERT Polska describes the operation as deliberately destructive rather than financially motivated.

Both cases show the same thing: the method works, and its consequences are physical. In Lviv no stock spoiled, but people sat in cold flats.

The cost of a single incident

Damage estimates in France differ by source. Les Mousquetaires spoke of several million euros, while the group's chief executive Thierry Cotillard put losses at tens of millions of euros nationwide in a single day. At store level, specific figures exist: in Haguenau, one Intermarché and a neighbouring Super U reported losing 270,000 euros of stock. No final audited figure has been published, so every number above is an estimate. The chain also warned that some of its insurance policies may not cover this type of incident.

The benchmark the author draws from this is short: the attack lasts hours, the bills arrive for months.

The limits of the record

Precision matters here. The method is established: remotely altering the settings of industrial controllers produces a physical result. The sequence of incidents and the response of state agencies are established. Attribution, however, differs case by case and carries different weight in each. The column deliberately does not rest on the involvement of any particular state, which is the correct caution: an official accusation is not the same as an established fact. It should nonetheless be recorded that on 9 November 2026 France publicly accused Iran of involvement in the attacks on refrigeration systems; the Pentagon has named no perpetrator; and for the Polish episode CERT Polska points to a cluster linked to Russian services, while Dragos names ELECTRUM with moderate confidence.

What remains publicly unknown is how much medicine and blood product was ultimately lost, the full list of affected sites, and the makes and models of the controllers through which access was obtained. Without those quantities, any figure for medical consequences would be an assumption, so we do not offer one. This does not weaken the column's case, which rests on the structure of the vulnerability rather than on the size of the loss.

Seventy-two hours

On 30 October 2026 the European Commission adopted Communication C(2026) 8250, released in early November, setting out guidelines on population preparedness. It continues the Preparedness Union Strategy adopted in March 2025 and asks member states to promote at least 72 hours of self-sufficiency as a minimum baseline. The document is not binding.

«We taught refrigerators to talk to the cloud, and Brussels is reminding us that it is no bad thing to keep a torch at home.»
– Denys Tsvaig, UNIAN

The question the author puts is not addressed to citizens: if we teach people to be self-sufficient for three days, are hospitals, water utilities and cities ready to hold out as long. For healthcare that question has a concrete form - not a water reserve, but whether refrigeration plant keeps working when external control is lost.

«Who actually holds the off switch for our refrigerators, our networks and our hospitals?»
– Denys Tsvaig, UNIAN

Why this is DeHealth's subject

The cold chain is the condition under which medicines, vaccines and blood products can be used at all. When a controller changes the temperature, what is lost is not information but the product itself, and the only way to establish that is through logs kept by the same system. This is why an independent loop for medical storage is not a technical detail: whether a stock can be certified fit after an incident depends on it.

The same principle applies to health data. Registries, electronic records and telemedicine sit in data centres and depend on the same cooling, power and access controllers as everything else. The resilience of that infrastructure is not a technical footnote to healthcare but the condition of having access to data on the day it matters most.

«In cybersecurity there is no more expensive mistake than waiting for conclusive proof of a threat before starting to defend against it.»
– Denys Tsvaig, UNIAN

The full column is on UNIAN.

All news